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SCIENCE, COMMON SENSE, AND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM*
Jerome HallV*
Professor Hall advocates a reappraisal of the current trend in
criminal law of substituting expert psychiatric testimony for
common-sense determinations of insanity based on the long
experience of the criminal-law tradition. Holding that the
average layman is as competent to recognize extreme mental
illness as the psychiatric expert, the author discusses the doc-
trine of the "irresistible impulse" and submits that the current
departures from the M'Naghten rule tend to "substitute the
ideology of a particular group of psychiatrists for the principle
of moral responsibility." Professor Hall suggests that realistic
reform cannot be achieved without considering the "moral
life and its connection with the criminal law."
Lawyers, like historians and philosophers, construct a more or less
organized view of the world about them; the nature of our profession
and the temper of the times incline us toward doing this in terms of
basic conflicts. Viewing the contemporary scene from the perspective
of a common lawyer, I see a fateful conflict between a powerful move-
ment of thought and the common sense of law, especially the criminal
law, for it is there that the human drama is centered.
The current intellectual movement is arrayed in the prestigious
mantle of science. But a lawyer may be allowed some misgivings about
the reduction of ideas and values to facts. Is it an advance in under-
standing to interpret philosophy and the lives of great men in terms
of the Oedipus Complex, or does that merely confuse meanings with
facts and problematic origins? Similar doubts arise concerning a
prominent school of ethics which hardly touches what most people re-
gard as ethical principles, and also about a behavioral social science
which takes physics as its model.
Science is a system of high-level generalizations of the co-variation of
factual variables, and its method is primarily that of external observa-
tion. The progress of the physical sciences is ample evidence of the
potency of scientific method in the realm of inanimate matter. But in
*This Article is based on the John F. Murray Endowment Lecture given by
Professor Hall at the State University of Iowa on October 18, 1963.
**Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University. PtLB., J.D.,
University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard Law School; Jur. Sc.D., Columbia Uni-
versity.
1044
SCIENCE, COMMON SENSE, AND CRIMINAL LAW
the human sphere, no remotely comparable knowledge has been ac-
quired despite the attraction of the theories of Hume and Comte; even
if it were available, its relevance to problem-solving in a democracy
would be far from evident.
Nevertheless, the trend seems increasingly toward reliance on ex-
perts in affairs which have long been regarded as the domain of com-
mon sense." It was not a lawyer but a psychiatrist who w-arned:
"Modern psychology can become a tremendous danger for man!"2 The
tangled issue in which we are involved, stated baldly in its ultimate
implication, is whether one will be able to continue to trust the ele-
mentary processes of his mind and his daily experience or whether
he will be reduced to dependence upon experts to tell him what he
"really" sees, feels, and thinks, why he acts as he does, and what his
personal experience means.
If one appraises the potential counterweights among institutions and
disciplines, especially ethics and philosophy, it seems no merely pro-
fessional predilection to conclude that how this issue will be resolved
depends largely on whether the criminal law can survive the current
criticism of its moral foundation. For the criminal law is not a mere
happenstance or a technology remote from the main stream of human
history. It is an institution which represents more than 700 years of
thoughtful experience in dealing with the primary problems of society.
It was not imposed by a hereditary elite, but is instead the product
of the commerce of many keen minds with popular ideas. Not only
were custom and public opinion the original sources of the common
law, but laymen also participated in the processes of criminal law
as members of legislatures, grand and petit juries, and the police force.
Lawyers, judges, and the writers of treatises mediated between science
and the flow of daily life. Unlike the physical sciences and technologies,
the law of crimes therefore represents the layman's thought and values
clarified by the sensitivity of bench and bar to the progress of knowl-
edge.
This law expresses the meaning of freedom and responsibility in
careful distinctions among such concepts as intention, recklessness,
act, negligence, mistake, and coercion. It clarifies the values of per-
sonality, property, and association in its classification of types and de-
grees of harm-doing; and in its systematic side it represents a high
achievement of disciplined imagination. So long as that legal institution
I "Scientific dogmatism is more alive, chiefly in 'intellectual' circles; one can only
hope that it is the innate good sense of the public which prevents its gaining social
influence, and that this will continue to operate." Knight, Intelligence and Social
Policy, 67 ETmcs 155, 164 (1957).
2 BFRGLE & MVEa.LoO, JUsTIcE AND INJUSTICE 169 (1963).
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survives in its essential rational and ethical character, even the least
of men is given some assurance of human worth. By like token, if
people come to believe that the foundation of the criminal law is un-
sound, a new strange era in our history will have arrived.
Common sense has always had its defenders among scholars who
thought philosophy should be brought down from the clouds and ap-
plied to everyday problems, and in this century it found a particularly
resourceful advocate in G. E. Moore.3 Moore called attention to certain
philosophical statements: there are no material things, time is unreal,
nothing exists unperceived, and so on; and he proceeded to refute them
by giving examples of the persuasive use of everyday language which
flatly contradicted them. To the thesis that there are no material things,
he replied, "here's one hand, and here's another, two material things;
therefore, that thesis is certainly fallacious." Concerning the statement
that time is unreal, he said, "after lunch I went for a walk, and after
that I read a book; obviously, events follow or precede one another in
time." And regarding the statement that nothing exists unperceived,
he said, "How absurd! No one saw my bedroom while I was asleep
in it; yet it certainly did not cease to exist." In order to appreciate the
force of Moore's position, one might expand his illustrations and assume
that 5,000,000 persons were looking on under every imaginable condi-
tion, that they all agreed that Moore had two hands, was holding a
pen, that these were material things, and so on.
What must be directly added, however, is that the philosophers who
made the statements criticized by Moore would agree that for ordinary
purposes, it is correct to say that hands are material, that one is abso-
lutely certain he is holding a pen in his hand, and so on. But, they
would insist, this does not alter the fact that from a logical viewpoint
factual propositions are only probably true while the implications of
compendent propositions are certainly or absolutely true. Nor did
Moore refute the idealist epistemology that sense-data, not "ultimate
realities," are perceived. Some writers have therefore said that al-
though Moore was correct if philosophy is appraised in terms of or-
dinary speech, the issue only concerned the use of words.
But much more than the correct use of words in everyday speech
is involved. If common sense must be distinguished from pure science
and philosophy by virtue of its practical intention, it is also true that
these types of knowledge are closely connected. Lawyers and judges
have always studied science and ethics with a view to improving the
law; and on the other hand, scientists and philosophers began with
common sense knowledge, proceeding thence to suit their theoretical
3 Moore, A Defence of Common Sense, in Coi omoa y BrsH PHILOsoPHY
193 (Muirhead ed. 1925); see THE PHmosopam op G. E. MooR (Schilpp ed. 1942).
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requirements. What is particularly significant is that common sense
is not simply dependent on or subordinate to philosophy and science.
If one were told, for example, that science has discovered that red is
really green, he would still decide that he had better stop when what
he saw was a red traffic light, especially if the traffic policeman did not
seem a likely candidate to win over to the higher truths of physics!
There is an everyday world in which desks and sidewalks are solid
material things; and the fact that physicists say they are unstable,
moving clusters of atoms does not detract from the significance or the
validity of the common sense perception of these matters in the every-
day world. Indeed, in the perspective of daily life, the common sense
view is the correct one, and theories of the structure of matter are ir-
relevant.
We must go farther than that when we compare expert knowledge
with common sense in the broad areas of politics, social life, and law.
Until recently, the hardly challenged view was that the fact that a man
is an expert in a particular field does not equip him with the knowledge
required to draft a code of law, and that with reference to political and
legal policy, the expert is apt to be singularly unhelpful, committed to
a narrow outlook and lacking the balanced judgment of intelligent
laymen.4 This, of course, is one of the grounds upon which the superi-
ority of democratic government is based, quite apart from its ethical
appeal. Common experience is also the foundation of social morality,
including that of criminal law; and the fact that psychiatrists and be-
havorial social scientists translate "right" and "wrong," "good" and
"evil" into factual terms may conform to a theoretical requirement, but
it does not touch the validity of these concepts in daily life.
The late Judge Learned Hand said that the function of the expert
witness was not to state facts but to draw general inferences from them,
in effect, to state scientific laws.5 But expert testimony has been ex-
tended far beyond those limits; and while I will not deal with the
niceties of this problem, I wish to raise one or two questions relevant
to this discussion.
In most states (Massachusetts, Maine, and New York seem to be
exceptions) laymen who have observed a defendant may testify that in
their opinion he was insane at a certain time. A psychiatrist who has
never seen a defendant is also permitted to give his opinion regarding
his sanity and to base it upon hypothetical questions.6 The premise is
4 LAsxi, TbE LInTATIoNs or TH ExrERT 9-10 (Fabian Tract No. 235, 1931).
5Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. Rnv. 40 (1901).
6State v. Turner, 126 Me. 376, 138 Ati. 562 (1927); Commonwealth v. Gordon,
307 Mass. 155, 29 N.E.2d 719 (1940); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 Mass. 337 (1854);
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that there is a science of psychiatry, or at least that it comprises a field
of expert knowledge which validates this procedure.
Conditioned, as we have been, to thinking of mental illness and
psychiatrists as we do of physical illness and doctors, it may seem
iconoclastic to say that psychiatry is very unlike medicine and that
mental illness, if not a myth, as an able psychiatrist maintains,7 is so
different from diseases of the body as to make even a distant analogy
dangerous if not misleading.' In Europe, psychiatry is often a separate
type of practice, and it is recognized here that at least the practice of
psychoanalysis is very different from that of medicine.9 Unlike the
situation in physical science, there are many schools of psychiatry-
Freudian, neo-Freudian, Jungian, Adlerite, Rankian, Reichian, ex-
istentialist and others--and they are frequently at war with each
other.0 Critical study of the literature on "mental disease" has shown
how amorphous this notion is in comparison with "physical disease."-
If "mental disease" is taken to connote a standard, as seems widely
agreed, the question becomes, which or whose standard? Minorities,
artists, and heroes have deviated from the statistical pattern of normal-
ity. A psychiatrist's advice to adapt is often dismissed as an individual
preference or as implying that expediency should still the voice of con-
science. Some psychiatrists have concluded that there are no patho-
logical facts or functions to which "mental disease" refers, but only
different personal problems about which psychiatrists, rather than
clergymen and family doctors, are now consulted.
It is not my purpose to labor the fact that psychiatry is not a science
or to deny that psychiatry has contributed a great deal to our knowl-
edge of human nature and that it can be very helpful in the trial of is-
sues involving mental disease and in relieving the tensions of distressed
People v. Kohlmeyer, 284 N.Y. 366, 31 N.E.2d 490 (1940); WEmo rN, MENTAL DTS-
OnDER AS A CRinNAL DEFENSE 280-83 (1954).
7 SzAsz, Tm MYTH OF MENTAL IUNESS (1961).
8 ",.. the model of physical disease does not adequately apply to the neuroses
and to antisocial reactions. Moreover, the moment one shifts from the model of
physical disease, one faces the problem of value judgments." Editorial Discussion
of Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, in ExPLORATIONs nr SOCIAL
PSYCHIATRY 159, 160 (Leighton, Clausen & Wilson eds. 1957).0
"Psychoanalysis has little resemblance to most forms of medical treatment; its
methods are educational and its goals prescribe a new pattern of living and a
reorientation in many basic values." Id. at 158. .... only in the United States
has psychoanalysis been defined as a medical specialty. Although physicians
seem to be the preferred candidates everywhere, a significant proportion of Euro-
pean psychoanalysts are medically untrained." SzAsz, op. cit. supra note 7, at
95.
10 SZASZ, id. at 93.
11JAHODA, CURRENT CONCEPTS OF POSITVE MmNAL HEALTH (1958); WOOTTON,
SOCIAL Scmc .AND SOcIAL PATHOLOGY (1959).
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persons. The present point is that whatever expertise psychiatrists
have, it does not inhere in any special competence to recognize persons
suffering from extreme mental illness.- While able psychiatrists are
expert in discovering hidden facts about the personality, in tracing the
course of a mental illness, and, one hopes, in the therapy of neuroses,
the recognition of psychotics is not a matter of placing symptoms in a
technical or scientific classification. It depends largely on a value-
judgment based on knowledge and experience of everyday life.
In view of the importance of this question and the diffidence of lay-
men regarding what is assumed to be a matter of science or expert
knowledge, I should like to quote several distinguished psychiatrists
in support of these statements. Dr. Frederick C. Redlich, head of the
department of psychiatry at Yale University, said: "I think we know
what the seriously ill person in a given culture is. That we do know. In
this respect we agree, incidentally, with policemen, with the clerk in
the drug store. Our crude diagnostic criteria are reasonably similar."',,
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment stated in its Report:
Even if it were on other grounds desirable to do so, it would, in the
present state of medical knowledge, be out of the question to remove the
issue of criminal responsibility from the courts and entrust its determina-
tion to a panel of medical experts, as has sometimes been suggested. In
our view the question of responsibility is not primarily a question of
medicine, any more than it is a question of law. It is essentially a moral
question, with which the law is intimately concerned and to whose solution
medicine can bring valuable aid, and it is one which is most appropriately
decided by a jury of ordinary men and women, not by medical or legal
experts.14
Recently, Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher, long associated with Baltimore
courts, wrote:
Contrary to the belief held by many lawyers and judges, psychiatrists
do not want to take over the business of making the decisions in regard
to responsibility, in cases pleading insanity. The suggestion frequently
made, that special blue-ribbon juries composed of psychiatrists should
do this, has met with no enthusiasm among psychiatrists. It is their
feeling that intelligent laymen, representing the community conscience,
should decide, since the verdict is not dependent solely on the presence or
absence of significant psychiatric deviations, but on even more subtle and
complex factors, essentially sociological in nature. 5
I2"It is unlikely that toxicologists would be tolerated in courts of law if one
would assert that he found a large quantity of arsenic in the body fluids of a
deceased person, and another would state that he found, by the allegedly same
operations, none. Yet this sorry spectacle is commonplace in regard to psychiatric
findings." SzAsz, Psychiatric Expert Testimony--Its Covert Meaning and Social
Function, 20 PsYcHIATRY 313, 314 (1957).
"3Redlch, Definition of a Case for Purposes of Research in Social Psychiatry,
in INTERRELATIONS BETWEE mm SocrAL ENvnRo==T AmD PsYCHIATRIc Dis-
oRDERs 120 (Milbank Memorial Fund 1953).
'
4 RoYAL ConussioN oN CAPrrAL Pum m T, 1949-1953 REPORT No. 283, at 100
(1953).
'5 Guttmacher, What Can the Psychiatrist Contribute to the Issue of Criminal
Responsibility?, 136 J. oF Nmvous & TirTAL DisEASE 103, 105 (1963). Cf. the
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And Dr. Frederic Wertham, one of our leading forensic psychiatrists,
said: "I think it would be a calamity if the disposition of criminal cases
would be taken out of the hands of judges and given into the hands
of psychiatric and other experts."' 6 Other able psychiatrists have ex-
pressed similar opinions.'7
These are not opinions regarding constitutional or other legal require-
ments of trial by jury. They reflect a factual agreement among psychia-
trists who, it should be noted, represent various, sometimes sharply op-
posed, positions on other issues, for example, regarding the M'Naghten
rule. The significance of this must also be especially distinguished from
the usual one where a jury is needed to make decisions regarding con-
flicting but admittedly expert testimony.1 8 The above statements are
based on the simple ground that laymen are at least as competent as
psychiatrists in recognizing persons suffering from extreme mental
illness. The impression given by current rules of evidence, that a
psychiatrist's opinion on the issue of insanity is a matter of expert
knowledge, is therefore an unwarranted influence on the jury's de-
cision. That more than that is involved is evident in the importance
some appellate courts have attached to psychiatric testimony."9
There are other areas where psychiatry is wrongly applied. For ex-
ample, underlying much of the receptivity toward current criticism of
criminal law is the belief that repressed traumatic experiences domi-
nate human conduct to the point of invalidating common distinctions
among conscious action, inadvertent movements, and accidents. The
"Unconscious" was employed by Freud as a special theory to account
for lapses of memory and mistakes;2 0 unfortunately, it has been given
contrary opinion of Dr. Dale C. Cameron, Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital, reported in the Washington Post, October 16, 1963. Dr. Cameron, testifying
before a Senate Committee, urged that the jury be restricted to finding whether
the defendant committed the act charged against him and that a panel of psychia- -
rists be authorized to decide the question of responsibility and what should be
done with convicted defendants.
26 Wertham, A Psychiatrist Looks at Psychiatry and the Law, 3 BuFFAuo L. Rsv.
41,48 (1953).
7 "Perhaps the law is wise in leaving this to a jury of twelve laymen ....
Cleckley, Psychiatry: Science, Art, and Scientism, in PsYciATRY AND REsPoNsi-
Ba.rry 98 (Schoeck & Wiggins eds. 1962). See supra note 12 and infra note 32.
I8 "The expert has something different to contribute. This is a power to draw
inferences from the facts which a jury would not be competent to draw." Mc-
CoRmUcx, EvMXENCE 28 (1954); cf. "I think it follows from the foregoing that
psychiatrists may not testify as to their conclusions as to the ultimate questions
of insanity and causality which must be decided by the jury." McDonald v. United
States, 312 F.2d 847, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Miller, J., dissenting).
10 See the cases discussed by Miller, J., in McDonald v. United States, supra note
18, at 859-61, and Reid, Disposition of the Criminally Insane, 16 RuTGERs L. REv. 75,
78 n.17 (1961).
2 o MAcITYRE, THE Ucoxscious (1958).
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a much wider application. But when a normal adult says, for ex-
ample, that he killed a man for money or because of jealousy and the
situation makes that persuasive to intelligent laymen, the fact that a
psychiatrist says, "no, he killed him because of the repressed traumatic
experience of his mother's rejection of him" is no ground for abandon-
ing common sense and supinely accepting what the psychiatrist says
is the "real truth" of the matter. If the Unconscious is opposed to
common experience, that can be refuted in the way Moore criticized
the philosophers. One can say, for example, "I decided yesterday to
write a letter to X, and today I wrote that letter." One can say, "Y,
who had been working for twenty hours, was driving his car and, just
as he began to nod, he ran into a pedestrian." One can say, "Z, driving
at an ordinary speed, ran over an icy spot and at the same time, a
man slipped on the sidewalk and fell into the path of Z's car." Emulat-
ing Moore, one may add, "it is absurd to say there is no important
difference between these cases. People distinguish them every day,
and in law very different consequences are attached to them. Besides,
I had a reason to write X, and the assertion that this is a mere ration-
alization and that, in fact, I was made to do it by unconscious forces
is not only unsupported, it also confuses physically caused movements
with action for reasons," and so on.
In sum, if the question is asked-How can a layman, however intelli-
gent, presume to set his opinion against that of an expert?-the answer
is not in the indiscriminate terms that the so-called expert is not really
an expert because his discipline is not a science, for there is the realm
of informed insight. It is that the layman is not challenging the expert
in areas where the latter may properly claim expert knowledge. Where
the issue depends mostly on ordinary experience and the common
morality expressed in the criminal law, it is a very different matter.
The thesis outlined above is applicable to much of current thought.
But because of the particular importance of psychiatry in the current
struggle for power to control the lives of men without limitation by the
rule of law, this is the discipline which has been selected for special at-
tention in the time available. Psychiatry covers a vast field, touching
almost every department of thought, and its literature includes not
only very informed insights, but also sheer nonsense. Accordingly,
as I have already indicated, no sweeping appraisal of that discipline is
intended.
The crucial point of contact in the encounter between psychiatry and
the common sense of criminal law is the "irresistible impulse" hypo-
thesis. This is sometimes phrased in terms of "inability to conform," as
in the Model Code of the American Law Institute; but there is no sig-
nificant difference between either formula and the Durham rule except
1964] 1051
that the latter also places on the prosecution an impossible burden of
proof of negative "causation. '21 The net result of each of them is to
substitute the ideology of a particular group of psychiatrists for the
principle of moral responsibility. The "irresistible impulse" thesis had
its origin in the psychology of separate mental faculties, implying that
one of them, say, volition, can be seriously disordered while intelli-
gence remains quite normal. Of course, psychiatrists who advocate
the abandonment of the M'Naghten rule do not accept this outmoded
psychology, but they do not criticize this phase of it because that can
be suited to their program to eliminate criminal responsibility as well
as to their theory that intelligence and morality are negligible factors
in human action.
In current advocacy of the "irresistible impulse" test, a great deal is
made of some remarks by Cardozo in an address to a medical academy
in 1928.2 With great respect, I submit that this address plainly in-
dicates that Cardozo had not gone thoroughly into this question; for
example, he did not cite any critical discussion of the subject.2 Nor
does there seem to be any decision or other work by Cardozo which
indicates that he was much interested in psychiatry. It is also rather
clear that in this address Cardozo was raising questions rather than
urging definite reforms. For example, he said: "I do not say that either
psychology or medicine or penology has yet arrived at such a stage as
to make a revolution in our system of punishment advisable or possi-
ble." And he added: "One takes a large order when one offers to re-
shape from its foundations a scheme of penal justice." In this address,
Cardozo, discussing the Holmes case decided in 1842 (where several
men were cast overboard to save persons in a sinking boat from drown-
ing), said that if no one volunteered to sacrifice himself so that the
others might survive, or if too few volunteered, "the human freight
must be left to meet the chances of the waters."24 The opinion in Holmes
referred to the priority of passengers, except the minimal crew required
to man the life-boat and, also, to casting lots or some other method of
fair selection of those to be sacrificed; and I believe the law almost
everywhere recognizes the defense of state of necessity within the above
conditions. I mention these matters only to suggest the dubious validity
of some of Cardozo's remarks and that the issue of "irresistible impulse"
should not be decided on the basis of authority.
21 HALL, GENERAL PRmcIPLs OF CmunAL LAw 512-18 (2d ed. 1960).
- Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in SzLmcT= WRr=mIs oF Bzn3Trx
NATHAw CAMozo 371 (1947).
23 E.g., Waite, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Liability, 23 MIcH. L. RPv. 443
(1925).
24 Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 22, at 381, 382, 390.
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Nonetheless, there seems to be a current tendency to accept the "ir-
resistible impulse" thesis without thorough study of this complicated
problem. In an address in March 1963, to the Holdsworth Club of
Birmingham, Lord MacDermott said: "There is, today, little doubt that
a disease of the mind may so affect the will power of the afflicted per-
son that he can no longer resist his impulses, and it seems odd that this
consequence should not, when proved, suffice to absolve the accused
from criminal responsibility."25 The distinguished Lord Chief Justice of
Northern Ireland did not say what had induced this definite opinion,
nor did he adduce any evidence of the expressed view of "will-power."
More troublesome still is that the general significance of the "irresisti-
ble impulse" thesis was not considered. The reasons are not difficult
to surmise, and they have no doubt influenced able lawyers and judges
in this country despite the fact that the law of England, Canada, most of
Australia, and a large majority of the American states has stood firm
against the insistence of psychiatrists in this respect.
The issue is apparently believed to concern only a particular de-
fense that is infrequently raised, mostly in murder cases. Then, there
is the publicity given the philosophy of psychiatrists and social workers
that "sickness, not sin," is the root of harm-doing; indeed, it has been
said that Freud has more influence in this country than any other
modern thinker.26 There is, next, the moral principle that "ought
implies can" which, applied here, means that although capacity to
recognize the difference between right and wrong is a presupposition
of moral responsibility, there must also be ability to conform to what is
recognized as right. There is also the experience which many persons
have had, of doing something under temptation which they knew they
should not do, exemplifying the invalidity of the Socratic theory that
virtue is knowledge (but not the irresistibility of the temptation!).
There are also popular misconceptions of kleptomania and pyromania.27
To all this must be added the fact that, just as laymen hesitate to
challenge the competence of psychiatric testimony on the question of
insanity, so, too, is such a challenge even more difficult to raise when
reputable psychiatrists insist that there is a psychosis, popularly called
"irresistible impulse."
Only a chance study of this subject twenty years ago8 and continued,
if sporadic, interest in it since then have made it possible for me to
question the opinion of judges whom any academic lawyer must greatly
respect. The plain fact is that it takes a long time and considerable
25 MAcD)ERionw, MuRnER nx 1963, 18 (1963).
26 RnpF, FREDD THE MN OF ME MORALIST xi (1959).
27 Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, J. FoR. Sc., April,
1956, p. 1.
28 Hal, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 COLum. L. REv. 677 (1945).
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reading to recognize the many facets of this problem.2 9 There is, of
course, no assurance that all who have read in this field, including the
present speaker, have profited from their study, nor any that general
agreement on it will be eventually reached. The underlying factors are
extremely diverse and complex. But if it is true that very few lawyers
and judges have been able to devote the required time to this difficult,
far-ranging subject, it may surely be hoped that if and when they do
that, the area of disagreement will be considerably narrowed and that
solutions will be considered which have hardly been thought of thus
far. In any case, it seems to me that the "irresistible impulse" theory is
a dangerous fallacy which strikes at the heart of moral responsibility;
this raises an issue which unfortunately does not lend itself to com-
promise or expedient solution. Accordingly, I am bound to submit, with
deference, that acceptance of the "irresistible impulse" thesis in any of
its formulations is a serious mistake.
In the first place, when a psychiatrist testifies in terms of "irresistible
impulse," it cannot be assumed that his meaning is understood. He
may be referring to certain behavior or he may be referring to a
theory, an explanation of that fact. If it is a fact or a dysfunction, why
is it impossible for very able psychiatrists to discover or observe it?
If it is a theory, it cannot be understood unless further inquiries are
made.
His statement may mean that an impulse was irresistible because in
his theory all human conduct is the necessary consequence of certain
causes. The defendant's act was only an instance of that pervasive
determinism. The theory may be that all "criminals" are sufficiently
diseased to be irresponsible.30 The defendant was only a member of
that class of persons. The psychiatrist's statement may mean that he
assumes that repeated harm-doing proves serious mental illness and
that the act in question, a repetition of previously committed harms,
was irresistibly performed in that sense. The statement may mean,
consistently with the M'Naghten rule, that the defendant was seriously
disordered in his cognitive functions and that this affected his capacity
to control his conduct. It may mean: "I dislike the criminal law, I re-
ject criminal responsibility, and I abhor punishing anyone. By saying
that the impulse in issue was 'irresistible,' I help an unfortunate person
get treatment in a hospital." There is also the bias of some experts
resulting from their employment, and the statement that the defendant
was driven by an "irresistible impulse" may be an expression of parti-
san loyalty.
20 A plan and program of study of this problem are presented in Hall, The
M'Naghten Rules and Proposed Alternatives, 49 A.B.A.J. 960 (1963).
3o 'VmEN nGE, TiE HmurrNMn 448, 449, 451 (3d ed. 1945); Karpman, Criminal
Psychodynamics: A Platform, I ARCHIVES OF CRmmUAL PsYCHOYNUUcs 96 (1955).
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There are, no doubt, other meanings of psychiatric testimony to the
effect that an impulse was "irresistible," that substantial capacity to
conform to law was lacking, and so on. How, then, can anyone be con-
fident that he knows what he is accepting when he approves the "ir-
resistible impulse" test or an equivalent formula?
In the second place, acceptance of the "irresistible impulse" test is
based on the assumption that those terms refer to a very severe mental
disorder. But, as was pointed out above, the recognition of persons suf-
fering from extreme mental illness is within the at least equal com-
petence of laymen. In daily experience, control of conduct means
control by normal intelligence. Ought implies can, but if there is
normal intelligence, there is capacity to refrain from the commission
of serious harms. This common-sense psychology is supported by able
psychiatric opinion,31 and if it is challenged, if it is asserted, for ex-
ample, that this particular type of psychotic person can be recognized
only by psychiatrists, there should be proof of that. Medically ac-
ceptable proof is not likely to be forthcoming if, as a forthright psychia-
trist recently said, "The psychiatrist merely makes it sound as if he is
dealing with scientific information by using technical psychiatric jargon
to describe behavioral events which could be described with ordinary
language.132 Other able psychiatrists say very emphatically that clinical
evidence does not in the least support the "irresistible impulse"
hypothesis, but only shows that there is compulsive action as regards
such harmless matters as frequent handwashing and that, in sum,
the "irresistible impulse" hypothesis is a throwback to pre-Freudian
psychology.33 There is the circularity of the reasoning from repeated
crimes to a compulsive psychosis and from that to the behavior,34 which
means that a psychosis was merely assumed. Since behavior alone-
for example, a series of robberies or homicides-is no proof of psycho-
31 "[T]he moral judgments of the schizophrenics were significantly different
from those of the nonschizophrenics; ... largely in being one of rejecting responsi-
bility for the welfare of others. Through detachment, social relations are judged
in terms of efficiency and orderliness instead of sympathy and compassion. People
were viewed and judged as mere objects, hardly different from inanimate objects."
Johnson, The Moral Judgment of Schizophrenics, 130 J. NEavous & MnTAL Dis-
SAsE 278, 285, 283 (1960). "If I wish to do something but will not, it is because I
anticipate the result-I am aware of the consequences-I am conscious of the im-
plications." Benda, Emotions and Freedom of Will, 2 J. LIBEAiL Mn sRY 52 (1962).
See infra, note 33.
32Liefer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of
Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists,
14 SYRAcusE L. Rv. 564, 573 (1963).
33Wertham, The Psychiatry of Criminal Guilt, in SOCIAL AI UFIG OF LEAL. CoN-
cm'Ts-CRnmAL GUILT 153, 164-65 (N.Y.U. Law School 1950).
34 WOOTTON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 233, 237-38.
1964] 1055
sis, the evidence of that must be sought in criteria independent of the
behavior. What is sometimes read into the "irresistible impulse" hypo-
thesis is an archaic notion of "will power," but "the will" is a myth
in current psychology 5 There is the contradiction of the widely ac-
cepted psychology of the integration of the functions of the personality
and its corollary that a serious disorder of one of them affects all the
others. It is not surprising, therefore, that, to my knowledge, there is
not a single book or article which reports the verification of the hypo-
thesis of a psychosis expressed in a compulsion to kill or rob and so on,
despite normal intelligence, in ways even remotely like those by
which empirical statements and theories about physical diseases are
verified. All of this points to one conclusion-there is no such psychosis.
Thirdly, it must be realized that if the "irresistible impulse" hypo-
thesis is unsound, the harm caused by its acceptance cannot be re-
stricted to the improper exculpation of a small number of defendants.
There is another very important side of this question-what is recog-
nized in a society as moral and legal responsibility and what this im-
plies about the prevailing view of human nature. The pertinent ques-
tion, especially among lawyers, is how do we discharge our responsi-
bility if we treat normal criminals, or even very neurotic ones, as
though they were insane? An able psychiatrist said at a recent An-
nual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association that psychiatry
is being used "to issue... criminal elements in our population... an
insurance policy against... punishment." 3
The moral life, like any work of art or science, is not an unorganized
gush of sentiment. It, too, has form, manifested in the system of legal
ideas which express the meaning of "responsibility" with reference
both to harm-doing and to those who not only ought to preserve social
values from the attack of harm-doers, but are also obliged to act ap-
propriately when those values have been harmed. The rule of law
now guards the innocent, but its protective wall would not survive
the dissolution of criminal responsibility. We cannot have it both ways,
and if we want morality and law, we must preserve the structure of
ideas and the discipline that are essential in them.
But suppose one has not had an opportunity to study the literature
of psychiatry sufficiently to form a critical appraisal of contradictory
psychiatric theories with reference to proposed basic changes in the
criminal law. In that situation, it seems to me that once it is recognized
that criminal responsibility is a moral-legal problem, not a medical or
psychiatric one, one's decision should conform to the principles of
35 Lewis, Health as a Social Concept, 4 BErisH J. SocIoLoaY 119 (1953).
36 Dr. Sidney Bolter, quoted by Thomas, The Dangerous Offender, 14 SYRAcusE
L. REv. 576 (1963).
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criminal law. One need not be deterred by the fact that the "irresistible
impulse" test has been accepted in a number of states and federal juris-
dictions. I believe any lawyer who takes a careful look at the Smith
decision, upon which the federal law on this subject is based, will agree
that it rests on the flimsiest imaginable foundation.3 7 The same is true
of recent Massachusetts decisions s interpreting Chief Justice Shaw's
opinion in Rogers" as an acceptance of the "irresistible imnulse" test.
And the law of most of the states which do recognize this test dates
from the 1840's and the psychology of separate faculties.
Finally, we may directly face the assumption that the "irresistible
impulse" test would work to the advantage of accused persons because
it would exculpate many who, it is claimed, are found guilty and pun-
ished under the M'Naghten rule. Even if we pass over the unproved
charge of present injustice, there are several reasons to believe that the
abandonment of the M'Naghten rule would be harmful rather than
beneficial to accused persons. The fact is, as Lady Barbara Wootton
has observed, that once the M'Naghten rule is abandoned, there is no
stopping place short of the complete abandonment of criminal respon-
sibility. Without exploring the full implications of this,40 we may note
that if the cognitive criteria of insanity are abandoned (and that is
implied in the prevailing American interpretation of the word "or"
between the M'Naghten rule and the "irresistible impulse" formula)
"mental disease," "psychosis," or "insanity" cannot be validly defined
in any terms relevant to criminal responsibility. This is evident in the
voluminous literature on "mental disease" which, because irrationality
is ignored, has only culminated in such empty formulas as "adjust-
ment," "lasting happiness," and the like as tests of normality.4' The
admission by psychiatric critics of the M'Naghten rule that they cannot
formulate any test of criminal responsibility and the expedient super-
ficial mixing of oil and water in the law of a few American states and
the American Law Institute's Code (which, while giving the impression
that the M'Naghten rule is retained, actually provides that inability to
conform is a sufficient, alternative test) support the position that no
significant test of insanity can be formulated or discovered if the func-
tion of intelligence is ignored. The pertinent question to ask, therefore,
37Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929), discussed in HmLL, op.
cit. supra note 21, at 503-04.38 E.g., Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 711-12, 150 N.E.2d 914, 919
(1958).
39 Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. 500 (1844).
40 Hall, The Purposes of a System for the Administration of Criminal Justice
(lecture delivered at Georgetown University on October 9, 1963).
4 1 WooTroN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 211-14.
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is, what will probably happen to persons who plead insanity if the
M'Naghten rule is abandoned?
The only alternative to legal adjudication of the issue of insanity is
determination of that question by psychiatrists, either directly or indi-
rectly, if no legal rule or instruction limits their influence on the jury.
In the midst of a dozen schools of psychiatry, clashing theories and
values, and untestable opinions remote from common experience, the
only foreseeable result is the unfettered authority of the particular
psychiatrists who win the struggle for power. It would not be pleasant
to recall facts showing that the ominous connotations of the "tyranny of
experts" have been grim realities in some countries in the recent past.
But most psychiatrists in this country are extremely permissive,
kindly persons. Should we not therefore set aside the barbaric use of
psychology and drugs by doctors and psychologists in dictatorial states
and have faith in our psychiatrists? 42 Faith springs eternal, but if we
wish to base an opinion on knowledge and the common sense of criminal
law, we must discover how much these psychiatrists do not know, and
we must also attend to centuries of Western history which preferred
the rule of law to the blandishments of wise and benevolent dictators. If
recent American evidence of abuse is required, the treatment of Gen-
eral Walker in a federal court should provide food for thought for those
who think that only persons who kill, rape, or rob will be involved in
the expanding power of psychiatrists. There are psychiatrists who think
moral responsibility is a fiction, who cavalierly announce that it may
take many years to cure petty thieves, that other countless thousands
are"dangerous,"although they havetommitted no crime, and that many
more cannot be cured and should be permanently segregated from con-
tact with the community. We already have "sexual psychopath" laws43
which can lead to the indefinite incarceration of persons most of whom
are indistinguishable from other offenders except by their relative
harmlessness, and who have not committed any crime or, in some states,
only a minor offense. There is the situation in the District of Columbia
and many states where acquittal on the ground of insanity opens not
the door to freedom but to a mental hospital,4 4 which has apparently
led many persons believed to be suffering from a mental illness to
42 Meerloo, The Crime of Menticide, 107 Am. J. PsycwATRy 594 (1951); Meerloo,
Medicaton Into Submission, 122 J. NEavous & MEALs DISEASE 353 (1955).
43 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Swanson,
Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CR. L., C. & P.S. 215
(1960).
44 
' Nowhere is the defendant [acquitted on the ground of mental irresponsibility]
simply set at liberty." WsmoFs, MmTAL DisORDER AS A CRnhAL DEFmSE 365
(1954). For the various rules on this subject, see id. at 366-76.
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refrain from raising a plea of insanity.45 If a hearing were required
after acquittal to decide the question of commitment, the psychiatric
theory relied on in the trial would presumably again prevail.
If the above are cogent indications of what lies in the offing for per-
sons accused of crime, not to speak of countless others who may be
found "dangerous" or lacking in "adjustment" or not enjoying "lasting
happiness" or falling short of other concepts of normal health which
reputable psychiatrists have formulated, the assumption that sub-
stituting an "irresistible impulse" test for the M'Naghten rule would
be to the advantage of defendants in criminal cases deserves criti-
cal study. It is possible that such an abandonment of law might
save an occasional psychotic person from prison, although able
forensic psychiatrists report that in many years of experience with
the present law, they did not learn of a single case of such injustice.46
The immediately relevant question, formulated realistically and, I trust,
in neutral terms, is-Which is better, to send an occasional psychotic
person to a penitentiary where his illness may be discovered and cared
for, or to send normal persons to insane asylums? Knowledge of what
goes on in some mental hospitals might make the choice very easy.
Beyond that loom the wider questions: If the legal test is abandoned
in the criminal law, how will this affect other legal relations and pro-
cedures? If unfettered administration by psychiatrists supplants the
rule of law, what will be the consequences for civil liberties and other
presently protected values?
At the root of current criticism of criminal responsibility is a conflict
between the values of a very small minority of the 15,000 or more
psychiatrists in this country and the values of the criminal law. The
values of these psychiatrists are shared by many other scholars and the
implications are serious. For example, a current school of ethics, im-
pressed by the philosophy of science and rejecting anything put
forth as knowledge of morality, interprets ethical principles in terms of
psychological facts; they hold that a value-judgment is only an ex-
pression of emotion or desire. One of the representatives of this
positivist ethics said that the statement, "Stealing money is wrong
* . . expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It
45D.C. CODE Axra. § 24-301(d) (1961). Because this provision may now so
operate as to impose upon acquitted defendants sanctions far more severe than
those attached to conviction, the defense attorney may believe that in spite of the
admonition of Canon 5, he will better serve the interests of his client by avoiding
the insanity defense entirely. Hallect* The Insanity Defense in the District of
Columbia-A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEO. L.J. 294 (1960); Krash, The Durham Rule
and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia,
70 YA Eu L.J. 905, 926 (1961).
4 6 HA1, op. cit. supra note 21, at 519, 520.
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is as if I had written 'Stealing money!!' "And he added, "[T] he function
of the relevant ethical word is purely 'emotive.' It is used to express
feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertions about
them.',47
This seems singularly unpersuasive when tested by reference to the
moral principles expressed in criminal law. A desire or emotion is a
fact, a particular phenomenon; but a law is a generalization, an idea.
A fact has no meaning apart from an idea or a set of ideas, and the law
of homicide or theft, for example, imparts certain meaning to facts.
Desires and emotions can be controlled by thought and thoughtful ac-
tion; criminal law guides them into approved channels. There is no
point in arguing about the fact of having desires or emotions, but there
has been much thoughtful discussion of penal policy carried on, evi-
dently, on the premise that there are better and worse solutions of
moral-legal problems. If positivist ethics were sound, criminal law
would consist of meaningless exclamations and grunts but not even
of growls. We could never say that any crime was harmful in the or-
dinary sense, since that would imply a value-meaning, not a merely fac-
tual characteristic. We would have to suppose that the classification of
crimes in terms of degrees of culpability and degrees of harm is an
arbitrary contrivance and that any other classification would be equally
lacking in validity. The meticulous care taken to elucidate the meaning
of the various crimes and their components, the construction of a self-
consistent set of principles, and the decision of cases according to law
must also be meaningless if they were reduced to the expression of
emotional attitudes.48
The ethical theory reflected in the criminal law is that values exist or
subsist in an intelligible sense, that they differ in importance, and that
they can be harmed in various ways and degrees. This implies that
ethical-legal rules and principles say something descriptively even if
they are not purely descriptive in the way factual statements are.49
While the generality of penal law does not alone establish its ethical
validity, since an entire class may have been unjustly chosen or the
punishment may be excessive and so on, the universality of a sound
law, its equality and fairness, are basic attributes of justice. This also
suggests a function of comparative criminal law in revealing large
areas of similarity in the legal rules and principles of many cultures,
which cannot be explained in terms of common origin. 0 Principles
of criminal law support the actions of officials; for example, the punish-
47 AYEr, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGIC 107, 108 (1954).
48 HL, LivnGa LAw OF DTmoceRic SocTry ch. 2 (1949).
4 0 EwING, SECOND THouGH s 3N MoA. P~mosor (1959).
50 HLLar, CouPARATIVE LAW iA SoomqL THEoRY (1963).
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ment of any convicted person is based on a rule of law which is implied
by certain principles, and these in turn rest on the basic proposition that
voluntary harm-doing proscribed by criminal law should and must be
punished. This system of rules, doctrines, and principles makes it
relatively easy to test the coherence and validity of any particular law
or proposed reform.
Although the central basic part of the criminal law is one of the
greatest achievements of Western civilization, that law in its entirety is,
of course, far from being a perfect work. One need only compare the
criminal law of Bracton's day with what it has become to recognize
its capacity for growth consistent with its foundation in moral respon-
sibility. From hardly more than a list of crimes and a rudimentary
actus non facit r'eus, nisi mhens sit rea, a system of law has been con-
structed expressing a refinement of moral ideas which finds no equal in
any other discipline or department of human activity.
It is not difficult, however, to discern several possible lines of further
actualization of its potentiality for improvement. There are, first,
certain existing rules, especially those concerned with strict liability,
negligence, and the felony-murder rule, which are plainly inconsistent
with the main thrust of the common law of crimes proscribing voluntary
harm-doing. This seems to me to be a sufficient reason to exclude these
rules from the criminal law. But since these are moot issues, it is
worth considering whether factual research might be helpful, for ex-
ample, in testing the opinion of some scholars that strict liability in
the so-called public welfare offenses influences the operation of busi-
ness to the public advantage. There has been some study of this ques-
tion but the results are far from supporting the assumption of deter-
rence. There is, however, wide agreement that the public welfare of-
fenses are not properly within the field of criminal law. The relevant
issue is therefore narrowed to the question whether they should be ex-
cluded from any type of legal control. If some form of regulation is
thought desirable, what is the best use that can be made of nonlegal
and nonpenal legal controls?
Whether negligent behavior should be excluded from penal liability
is also being discussed in many countries. Scholars are more sharply
divided on this question; one of the principal grounds upon which the
case for criminal liability is based is the assumption that punishment
deters such behavior, especially homicide by automobiles driven negli-
gently. It seems unlikely that rarely inflicted penalties can change the
personality of insensitive or awkward persons and alert them to danger
and to their duties, and the common law of crimes has almost wholly
eliminated at least avowed liability for negligence. But some form of
control is necessary and the pertinent question, again, is whether in
the large armory of legal and nonlegal controls, apt instruments can be
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found to deal with the underlying causes of negligent behavior.
For those who hold that negligent behavior should be excluded from
criminal liability,5' there are other important aspects of this question,
for example, the distinction of recklessness from negligence. This is
part of the problem of clarifying the present case law regarding the
difference between the "reasonable man" test as a method of inquiry,
which is necessary because it is impossible to see into the "hearts of
men," and objective liability, especially when it is imposed on persons
who are impaired in various ways short of insanity. The case for sub-
jective guilt (which is also the case for insisting on recklessness as the
minimal requirement of mens rea), is simply that liability should be
determined on the basis of the actual state of a particular person's mind,
not on that of the supposed "reasonable man." It seems to be in-
creasingly recognized in England and Australia, due, perhaps, to the
unfortunate Smith decision, 2 that the instruction to the jury should be
not in terms of what a "reasonable man" would have known, which is
apt to encourage reliance on hindsight of what happened, but in terms
of what this particular defendant knew or believed at the time of his
action. This is the rule in much, perhaps most, of the criminal law and
the indicated inconsistency of some rules, especially those on homicide,
as well as the feasibility of the principle of subjective fault, merits care-
ful consideration.
There is, next, the felony-murder rule which was terminated in
Britain by the 1957 Homicide Bill, but which persists in American
law. In some states the rule is retained in its ancient rigor so that even
the most unexpected accidental death occurring in the course of com-
mitting a felony is held to support liability for first-degree murder. If
distinction among degrees of guilt and consistency with sound principles
are desirable, it is time to abandon this archaic rule.
With reference to the law on mental incompetency, it may be added
that the fact that a jury can reach better decisions regarding the issue
of insanity than most psychiatrists does not support the view that the
jury should be left wholly uninstructed and unaided by sound rules
of law. Our system proceeds on the opposite premise. One may ap-
preciate the jury's competence and at the same time not wish to leave
them wholly subject to the influence of whatever theories, philosophies,
and reforms psychiatrists of the various schools espouse. There is no
escape from the obligation to decide that some theories and prefer-
51 Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 CoLmm.
L. REv. 632 (1963).
52 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, [1961] A.C. 290 (1960); Williams,
Constructive Malice Revived, 23 MODEmN L. REV. 605 (1960); Dixon, C. J., in Parker
v. The Queen, 37 Aust. L.J. 3, (1963); Lord Denning quoted in 79 L.Q. REv.
318 (1963).
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ences are so unsound or so far from being established that they must
be excluded or, at least, limited in their influence by recognized legal
tests. Nor is there any reason why this general practice should not
also prevail as regards the vast new stretches of psychiatry.
It seems to me both unproved and highly doubtful that psychiatric
testimony is limited by the M'Naghten rule or that injustices occur in
the administration of that rule in this country. On the other hand, it is
true that the terms of the M'Naghten rule are restricted to cognitive
functions. It is also clear that there is very wide agreement regarding
the psychology of the integration of the various functions of the person-
ality and that control of conduct is, therefore, as important as is under-
standing its nature and consequences. (In stating the facts in this way
one must not forget that there are not two separate independent vari-
ables-knowledge and control-but only a single process in which
knowledge and control are fused.) It plainly follows that the solution
is not abandonment of the M'Naghten rule but its supplementation in
terms of control or other mental functions. It should not be difficult
to formulate a test on the above widely agreed bases, which aptly
combine these factors.53
Other important problems which merit careful study can only be
referred to here. We have still to deal adequately with intoxication as
regards criminal liability and, also, as a social problem. There are
obvious changes that should be made in the field of sexual offenses,
especially in their prevailing severe punishment, even if recent recom-
mendations regarding homosexuality are not accepted.5 4 Finally, al-
though it would require heroism bordering on martyrdom to challenge
the current theory of what may be expected of or done to juveniles,
there is an obvious need for realistic study of the operation of juvenile
courts and treatment programs.
I should like to turn from these specific problems to a brief consider-
ation of some wider matters concerned with criminal law reform. In
planning a program to improve the criminal law, one could learn much
from European experience. In Europe, a project to reform the criminal
law is a national undertaking directed by the Minister of Justice. It is
therefore under relatively neutral direction because it is not a question
of persuading the Minister to accept a proposal, nor is he expected to
press for the acceptance of his views. His function is to encourage
the presentation of all competently maintained positions. One of the
most thorough recent Continental projects was completed in Germany
three years ago, and I have seen at least fifteen bulky volumes reporting
53 HALL, Op. cit. supra note 21, at 521-22.
54 DEVLmN, THE ENFoRCEmExT OF MORAS (British Academy 1959).
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the progress of that undertaking. Many discussions are reported in
great detail, and it is easy to discover which lawyers and scholars ad-
vocated particular changes and what the supporting reasons were. Not
only the majority positions but also those of the minority are set
out in detail. In a field like criminal law, where opinions are often
sharply divided, it is extremely important to have this information. The
fact that the national government sponsors such a project does not
mean that early legislation can be expected. In some European coun-
tries, there has been a series of projects and sometimes none of the
drafted bills were enacted. 0 But such methods provide full records of
continuity of effort which increase in value as time goes on and other
persons engage in similar undertakings.
The nature of the problems of criminal law suggests that psychiatrists
and criminologists, as well as thoughtful laymen, should be invited
to participate in the reform of that law. But it cannot be assumed that
this is always desirable. There are many psychologies and theories of
psychiatry and some of them are not only compatible with the morality
of criminal law, they can also assist the jury by adducing facts about
the defendant's personality, which will help to determine his culpability,
if any, and by guiding peno-correctional treatment. There are many
social problems regarding which a knowledge of the relevant facts
would help determine what laws should be enacted or what changes
in existing ones should be made; for example, knowledge of facts in the
field of receiving stolen property shows plainly that professional re-
ceiving is very different from ordinary receiving.5"
But there are also pseudo-factual problems raised, for example,
by the thesis that punishment has failed because after thousands of
years of punishing criminals, many crimes are still being committed.
The assertion amounts to saying that the human race would have been
better off without any criminal law, but there is no way of testing such
a statement. Even more plainly does the thesis of all-pervasive de-
terminism raise a pseudo-factual problem.
When such problems are raised, facts are often confused with quali-
ties. In criminal law, for example, "guilt," expressed in terms of the
principle of mens rea, must be distinguished from the sense of guilt, a
state of mind with which psychology is concerned"8 and which is some-
6' NIEsaMMC T UBER DIE SITZUNGEN DEE GROSZE1 SWAMrECUTSKOMxISSION
(Bonn).
Go Jescheck, German Criminal Law Reform: Its Development and Cultural-
Historical Background, in ESSAYS 3N CPmIINAL SCINCE 395 (Mueller ed. 1961).
57 HAu, THET, LAW AmD SocIET (2d ed. 1952).
us Ivimey, Neurotic Guilt and Healthy Moral Judgment, 9 Am. J. PsyczoAwAysls
8 (1949).
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times taken to mean tension between id and super-ego. Some guilty
persons lack a sense of guilt, as is sometimes said of sociopaths, and,
on the other hand, a neurotic sense of guilt may be very disproportion-
ate to actual guilt or even be found in persons who are not guilty of
having committed any harm. The substantive criminal law, built on
the moral guilt of voluntary harm-doing, does not require the support
of the psychiatric theory of the super-ego to be intelligible. 9 A man
who betrays his country, a paid killer, and other criminals are guilty
in a moral sense; and that is not to be confused with any feeling they
may or may not have regarding their harm-doing.
Accordingly, one must ask: what is to be gained, for example, by in-
viting three or thirty psychiatrists to assist in a project to improve the
criminal law if all of them represent a point of view which contradicts
the moral foundation of that law? This applies also to criminologists
who hold doctrinaire views on punishment, who think, for example,
that rehabilitation is the only justifiable objective of social control.
Although punishment alone would be a very inadequate policy, it is
also true that the permissiveness of psychiatrists and academic penolo-
gists is no substitute for criminal law and its enforcement. 60 There
should, of course, be freedom to air all opinions, if only to sharpen
the issues; but the inclusive penal policy of current criminal law in
which retributive punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation are each
given careful consideration is the guiding premise of realistic reform.
It would seem to follow that the standard for evaluating criminal pro-
cedure and administration is the fullest possible actualization of those
objectives.61 At present, however, we know very little of what happens
in the procedure and administration of the criminal law, and it is im-
possible to bring together the various fragments of present knowledge
in a way which gives a general view of the entire process. There are
various limitations placed on the police and their acquisition of evi-
dence. There are differences regarding the burden of proof, for ex-
ample, as regards the plea of insanity. There is wide variation in the
ways appellate courts appraise the facts in the records and control
the respective roles of jury and experts. There are wide differences
in sentencing and in the administration of peno-correctional institutions,
as well as in the operation of probation and parole laws.
We do know, in a general way, that the arrest of suspects and
59 Buber, Guilt and Guilt Feelings, 20 PsYCmATRY 114-20 (1957).
69WEST, CoNSCMICE AND SOClM-Y (1942); Schmideberg, The Promise of Psy-
chiatry: Hopes and Disillusionment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 19, 27 (1962).(aSilving, "Rule of Law" in Criminal Justice, in EssAYs = Cam=sx. ScimNCE
77 (Mueller ed. 1961).
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their prosecution is a highly selective process,2 and that the police are
influenced by public attitudes and the trial of criminal cases. We know
that felonies are frequently waived and pleas accepted to minor
offenses, and we have learned that this cannot be explained simply
on the political grounds which Raymond Moley emphasized thirty
years ago. We know that the time served in prison is often a small
fraction of the sentences imposed.6 3 But we are still far from having
adequate records of the facts and grounds of administrative actions.
In our present lack of knowledge, it is impossible to determine whether
anything more than lip-service is paid retributive justice or deterrence
or if any rehabilitation is actually achieved. The net result is that we do
not know whether there is any significant coherence between the pur-
poses of the system of substantive criminal law and what actually hap-
pens in the administration of that law.
I have carried the common sense of criminal law into the procedure
and administration of it with a view to envisioning a single legal process.
But if we stop even there, we remain within the orbit of professional
interest and fall short of realizing the potentialities of our subject. We
acknowledge the origin of the common law of crimes in popular custom
and belief. But those ideas, patterns, and goals did not cease to exist
when the legal profession set out to construct a system of law. They
are operative today, influencing and being clarified by the criminal
law. The final emphasis must therefore be on the social reality of the
criminal law, manifested in the conduct of the members of society.
Once the perspective is thus enlarged, it becomes evident that one does
not comprehend the full significance of criminal law if he views it only
in terms of prohibitions or commands or as a coercive apparatus or even
in the usual connotations of "protection of society." All of this is sig-
nificant, but what is most important is the moral life and its connection
with the criminal law. I have been suggesting that when lawyers de-
fend these social values from the criticism of experts and academic
specialists, they stand on the solid foundation of knowledge acquired
during 700 years of thoughtful experience.
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